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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal concerns the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (“FBI”) response to appellant American 
Civil Liberties Union’s (“ACLU”) request for 
information under the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).  The ACLU claims that 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey (“District Court”) erred in allowing the FBI to 
withhold 284 pages of responsive material pursuant to 
certain exemptions under the FOIA.  The ACLU also 
challenges the in camera procedure employed by the 
District Court for determining whether the FBI’s reliance 
on the FOIA’s exclusion provision was justified, if such 
reliance in fact occurred, and urges us to remand to 
employ a “Glomar-like” procedure instead.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court and decline to adopt the ACLU’s novel 
proposal. 
I. 
  In the wake of September 11, 2001, there have 
been efforts to restructure the FBI as the “domestic 
equivalent” of the Central Intelligence Agency.  See The 
9/11 Comm’n, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States 399 (2004).  Part of this 
restructuring has involved an overhaul of the FBI’s 
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longstanding internal guidelines in the form of a revised 
manual known as the Domestic Investigations and 
Operations Guide (“DIOG”) released by the Attorney 
General of the United States in 2008.  FBI, Domestic 
Investigations and Operations Guide (Dec. 16, 2008).  
Among other things, the DIOG authorizes FBI agents to 
engage in limited racial and ethnic profiling when 
conducting proactive assessments of criminal and 
terrorist threats.  Id. at 17.  Specifically, the DIOG allows 
FBI agents to identify and map “locations of 
concentrated ethnic communities” if doing so would 
“reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and 
vulnerabilities” and “assist domain awareness for the 
purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”  Id.  The 
DIOG also allows the FBI to collect and map data related 
to “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably 
believed to be associated with a particular criminal or 
terrorist element of an ethnic community.”  Id. at 44. 
 Prompted by a concern that the new DIOG would 
encourage unlawful racial profiling, the ACLU launched 
an initiative entitled “Mapping the FBI” that included a 
series of coordinated FOIA requests seeking records 
related to the FBI’s use of ethnic and racial data.  Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, Mapping the FBI: Uncovering 
Abusive Surveillance and Racial Profiling, Am. Civil 
Liberties Union (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.aclu.org/mapping-fbi-uncovering-abusive-
surveillance-and-racial-profiling.  One such request 
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targeted six FBI field offices in New Jersey and sought 
information “concerning the FBI’s implementation of its 
authority to collect information about and ‘map’ racial 
and ethnic demographics, ‘behaviors,’ and ‘life style 
characteristics’ in local communities.” 
 In response, the FBI searched its files and 
identified 782 pages of potentially responsive records.   
Of these, the FBI eventually released 312 pages (some of 
which were partially redacted),
1
 withheld 186 pages as 
duplicative, and, most importantly for our purposes, 
withheld 284 pages as exempt from disclosure.  The 
withheld records included ten Domain Intelligence Notes 
(“DINs”), a 2009 Newark Annual Baseline Domain 
Assessment (“Domain Assessment”), an Electronic 
Communication from October 30, 2009 (“2009 EC”), and 
five Newark Domain Management Team Maps 
(“Maps”).   
 Unsatisfied with this response, the ACLU, after 
exhausting its administrative remedies, filed suit against 
the FBI and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking an 
injunction for release of the withheld records.  On 
December 12, 2011, the FBI and DOJ moved for 
summary judgment, contending that the withheld 
                                                 
1
 The FBI’s first release on December 22, 2010 consisted of 
298 pages.  The FBI released an additional 14 pages on June 
20, 2011 and an additional six pages on February 22, 2012.   
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documents were exempted from disclosure under 5 
U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1) (“Exemption 1”), (b)(7)(A) 
(“Exemption 7A”), (b)(7)(C) (“Exemption 7C”), 
(b)(7)(D) (“Exemption 7D”), and (b)(7)(E) (“Exemption 
7E”).2  In support of this motion, the FBI submitted 
declarations by David Hardy, the Section Chief of the 
FBI Record/Information Dissemination Section (“Hardy 
Declarations”) that describe in detail each piece of 
information withheld and explain why it was exempted 
from disclosure under the FOIA, as well as a “Vaughn 
index”3 that conveys similar information in table format.   
 On January 20, 2012, the ACLU filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment.  The ACLU argued that 
the FBI failed to demonstrate that it had segregated and 
disclosed all non-exempt material from the withheld 
documents and that the FBI’s explanations for 
withholding certain documents were insufficiently 
detailed.  Additionally, the ACLU sought a court order 
requiring the FBI to submit an in camera declaration 
explaining whether it had relied on 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (the 
FOIA’s “Exclusion Provision”) to withhold additional, 
unidentified records, and the justification for this 
                                                 
2
 The DOJ and FBI also moved to dismiss the FBI on the 
theory that the FBI is not an “agency” under 5 U.S.C. § 552.  
The District Court granted this motion, noting only that 
“[w]here the DOJ is already a named defendant in a FOIA 
case, dismissing the FBI has no legal effect.” 
3
 See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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exclusion if it occurred.  The FBI submitted such a 
declaration on February 9, 2012. 
 The FBI released six additional pages on February 
22, 2012 and moved for summary judgment with respect 
to these pages on March 16, 2012.  On April 2, 2012, the 
ACLU again submitted a cross-motion for summary 
judgment, but at that point argued that “as briefing ha[d] 
progressed, it ha[d] become clear” that the in camera 
procedure it had originally requested on the Section 
552(c) issue was inadequate and urged the District Court 
to adopt a procedure “akin to the Glomar procedure 
established by the D.C. Circuit in Phillippi v. CIA, 946 
F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).”   
 On October 2, 2012, the District Court granted 
summary judgment for the FBI.  The District Court held 
that the withheld documents were exempted under 
Exemptions 1, 7A, 7C, 7D, and 7E, and that the FBI had 
satisfied its burden of demonstrating that none of the 
withheld information could be segregated and disclosed.  
The District Court also held, without confirming or 
denying the FBI’s reliance on FOIA’s Exclusion 
Provision, that “if an exclusion was invoked, it was and 
remains amply justified.”  The District Court based this 
conclusion on the FBI’s in camera declaration originally 
requested by the ACLU and declined to address the 
ACLU’s argument for adopting the Glomar-like 
procedure.  The ACLU timely appealed.  
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II. 
 We first address the District Court’s ruling on the 
FBI’s motion for summary judgment.  The District Court 
had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(4)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 
and we exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Due to the “unique configuration” of 
summary judgment in a FOIA case, in which “the 
opposing party (generally the requester) does not 
ordinarily have the factual information upon which the 
moving party (generally the agency) has relied,” this 
Circuit has held that “the familiar standard of appellate 
review promulgated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c) does not apply.”  McDonnell v. United States, 4. 
F.3d 1227, 1241-42 (3d Cir. 1993).  Instead, “[w]e 
employ a two-tiered test” under which we first determine 
“whether the district court had an adequate factual basis 
for its determination” and, if we find such a basis, “must 
then decide whether that determination was clearly 
erroneous.”  Abdelfattah v. United States Dept. of 
Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Because we conclude that ample evidence supported the 
District Court’s conclusion that the FBI satisfied its 
burden under Exemption 7A, we will affirm.  
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the FBI’s 
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reliance on Exemption 1 or Exemption 7(E) was proper.
4
 
A. 
The FOIA requires any “agency,” upon “any 
request,” to make records “promptly available to any 
person.”  28 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).  The purpose of this 
requirement is “to facilitate public access to Government 
documents,” and therefore its “dominant objective” is 
“disclosure, not secrecy.”  Sheet Metal Workers Int’l 
Ass’n, Local Union No. 19 v. United States Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 135 F.3d 891, 897 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Because “[p]ublic access to government information is 
not . . . all encompassing,” however, the FOIA 
“exempt[s] nine categories of documents from [its] broad 
disclosure requirements.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
The dispositive exemption in this case is 
Exemption 7A, which authorizes the withholding of 
“records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such law 
enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably 
be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 
§ 552(b)(7)(A).  “The agency bears the burden of 
justifying the withholding, and the [district] court 
                                                 
4
 The ACLU does not appeal the District Court’s rulings on 
Exemptions 7C or 7D. 
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reviews the agency claims of exemption de novo.”  
OSHA Data/CIH Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 
220 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000).  This burden may be 
satisfied by affidavits that describe the material withheld 
and why that material falls under a particular exemption.  
McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1241.  An agency is entitled to 
summary judgment when these affidavits “describe the 
withheld information and the justification for 
withholding with reasonable specificity, demonstrating a 
logical connection between the information and the 
claimed exemption . . . , and are not controverted by 
either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of 
agency bad faith.”  Davin v. United States Dep’t of 
Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1050 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Here, the ACLU does not contest that the 
information withheld by the FBI was “compiled for law 
enforcement purposes” and argues only that the FBI has 
not demonstrated that production of this information 
could “reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings.”  The ACLU acknowledges 
that when, as in this case, the disclosure of requested 
information poses risks to national security, an agency’s 
assessment of this risk is afforded substantial deference.  
See Ctr. For Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 
F.3d 918, 927-28 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  Nevertheless, the 
ACLU argues that the FBI is not entitled to summary 
judgment because its assertions that disclosure would 
disrupt enforcement proceedings are not “reasonably 
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specific” and are “called into question by contradictory 
evidence.”   
B. 
We reject the ACLU’s argument that the FBI’s 
release of similar racial/ethnic data in response to this or 
similar FOIA requests contradicts its assertion that 
release of the data withheld here would be harmful.
5
   
The Hardy Declarations explain that “each office faces 
different threats in each domain” and “[i]f similar 
information was released in another location, it was 
based on a decision specific to that domain and the 
relevance of the information to that domain.”  Common 
sense itself suggests that different data related to different 
ethnic populations in different cities used in completely 
different FBI investigations can vary greatly in 
sensitivity.  Further, we share the concern expressed by 
the Sixth Circuit in a related case that “if we adopted the 
                                                 
5
 Specifically, the ACLU cites to (1) the FBI’s partial release 
of DIN #9 in this case, which concerned an investigation of 
the MS-13 gang and contained data on various Hispanic 
communities in Newark, New Jersey, (2) a Michigan field 
office’s release of a memorandum concerning an 
investigation of international terrorist groups that contained 
data on “Middle-Eastern and Muslim population[s]” in 
Michigan, and (3) a San Francisco field office’s release of a 
similar memorandum concerning an investigation of Chinese 
and Russian organized crime syndicates that contained data 
on Chinese and Russian populations in that area. 
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ACLU’s reasoning . . . , agencies would be discouraged 
from making a good-faith effort to disclose as many 
responsive documents as possible for fear of estoppel.”  
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. F.B.I., 12-2536, 
2013 WL 4436533 at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 2013). 
We also disagree with the ACLU that the Hardy 
Declarations lack reasonable specificity when describing 
the risk of harm from disclosure.  The Hardy 
Declarations provide a section-by-section description of 
each of the withheld documents.
6
  The Hardy 
Declarations also explain exactly how disclosure of the 
requested ethnic and demographic data in each withheld 
document would interfere with enforcement proceedings: 
by revealing the target or focus of the FBI’s investigatory 
efforts.  J.A. 127 (for DIN #1); J.A. 129 (for DIN #2); 
J.A. 130-31 (for DIN #3); J.A. 132 (for DIN #4); J.A. 
134 (for DIN #5); J.A. 135 (for DIN #6); J.A. 137 (for 
DIN #7); J.A. 138 (for DIN #8); J.A. 140 (for DIN #10); 
J.A. 141 (for DIN #11); J.A. 907-08 (for Domain 
Assessment and 2009 EC); J.A. 910-11 (for Maps).  Of 
course, once these targets were alerted to the existence or 
exact focus of these investigations, they would likely 
“change their behavior and/or the ‘players’ to avoid 
                                                 
6
 For example, the description of DIN #1 reveals the date and 
the subject line of the document and outlines the document 
paragraph by paragraph (“summary paragraph,” “scope 
section,” “background section,” “judgments section,” “details 
section”). 
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detection and/or further investigation.”  It is hard to 
imagine how the FBI could provide a more detailed 
justification for withholding information under this 
exemption without compromising the very information it 
sought to protect. 
We further disagree with the ACLU that release of 
the “limited public source information” that it seeks 
“cannot reasonably be expected to tip off targets or 
permit them to circumvent investigations.”  The ACLU 
first contends that such disclosure would not be harmful 
because the “information sought is public to begin with.”  
This argument misses the obvious point that while the 
demographic data itself may be public, its use by the FBI 
is certainly not.  The Hardy Declarations reveal what 
should be obvious to anyone: that the harm from 
disclosure lies in revealing, indirectly, the FBI’s targeting 
preferences and investigative techniques—not in 
revealing demographic information that is already 
available to the public.  The ACLU further argues that 
such disclosure would not be harmful because the FBI is 
prohibited from using race or ethnicity as a “dominant or 
primary factor” in its investigations.  We reject this 
argument as it rests on the implausible assumption that 
only disclosure of a “dominant or primary factor” could 
impede an FBI investigation. 
Accordingly, we hold that the FBI has satisfied its 
burden under Exemption 7A with respect to all of the 
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withheld information.
7
  We need not, then, address 
whether the FBI has satisfied its burden under Exemption 
1 or Exemption 7E with respect to various subsets of this 
information. 
III. 
We next address the ACLU’s argument that this 
case should be remanded to apply its proposed “Glomar-
like” procedure to the Section 552(c) issue—i.e. whether, 
if the FBI withheld responsive documents pursuant to 
FOIA’s exclusion provision, such withholding was 
proper.  The ACLU proposed this procedure after they 
had already proposed—and the District Court had already 
conducted—an in camera review of the Section 552(c) 
issue.  The District Court declined to adopt the ACLU’s 
“Glomar-like” procedure, and we review this decision for 
abuse of discretion.  See Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 
F.3d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reviewing for abuse of 
discretion district court’s decision not to conduct in 
camera review); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 
213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000) (reviewing for abuse of 
discretion district court’s decision to rely on ex parte 
government affidavit in determining that crime-fraud 
                                                 
7
 Because we hold that the public source information sought 
by the ACLU is itself exempted from disclosure under 
Exemption 7A, we need not address the ACLU’s argument 
that the FBI failed to disclose all “reasonably segregable” 
non-exempt responsive information.   
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exception applies to attorney-client communications).  
We hold that no abuse of discretion occurred.
8
 
A. 
The ACLU’s proposed procedure is modeled after 
the procedure developed in Phillippi v. C.I.A., 564 F.2d 
1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976), later known as the “Glomar 
response,” which allowed the Government to “neither 
confirm nor deny” the use of one of FOIA’s exemptions 
prior to the enactment of Section 552(c).  See Am. Civil 
Liberties Union of Michigan, 2013 WL 4436533, at *7.  
When issuing a “Glomar response,” the Government is 
required to “provide a public affidavit explaining in as 
much detail as possible the basis” for its ability to issue 
such a response.  Phillippi, 564 F.3d at 1013.  Under this 
procedure, the Government’s explanation is to be 
reviewed in camera only as a last resort.  See id.  The 
ACLU proposes that this “Glomar procedure” be adapted 
                                                 
8
 The ACLU cites McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1242, for the 
proposition that the District Court’s “method for adjudicating 
the Section 552(c) claim” should be reviewed de novo.  The 
only language in this case that could arguably support this 
argument refers to “plenary review of issues of law.”  Id.  We 
find Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) and In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2000) to more directly address the issue of standard of 
review in these circumstances, and hold that an abuse of 
discretion should apply.   
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to the Section 552(c) context to operate as follows: 
[T]he Court [would] require Defendants to 
respond to Plaintiff’s concern that they may 
have relied upon Section 552(c) with . . . a 
public court filing indicating that 
Defendants interpret all or part of Plaintiff’s 
FOIA request as seeking records that, if they 
exist, would be excludable under Section 
552(c), and that therefore, the Defendants 
have not processed those portions of the 
Request . . . . Plaintiff could then brief . . . 
its argument that the types of records sought, 
if they exist, would not fall within the 
exclusion.  The Court could then determine 
. . . whether the type of information sought 
by Plaintiff, if it exists, is excludable under 
Section 552(c). 
J.A. 1019-20.  The ACLU argues that adoption of this 
procedure would permit more meaningful judicial review 
and better protect the interests of the litigants and the 
public.  We disagree, and hold that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion by conducting an in camera 
review.   
B. 
  District Courts have long enjoyed the discretion 
to employ in camera procedures in other circumstances 
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involving sensitive information.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 564 (1989) (upholding “in camera 
review of allegedly privileged communications to 
determine whether those communications fall within the 
crime-fraud exception” to attorney-client privilege); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“If the district court decides that the government should 
present information [to justify a grand jury subpoena] 
beyond the minimal . . . requirements, it may use in 
camera proceedings or ex parte affidavits to preserve 
grand jury secrecy, a procedure we have consistently 
endorsed.”).   
Nothing in the FOIA operates to limit this 
discretion.  In fact, the FOIA explicitly contemplates in 
camera review in the exemption context.  5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(4)(B) (providing that the District Court “may 
examine the contents of . . . agency records in camera to 
determine whether such records or any part thereof shall 
be withheld under any of the exemptions.”).  Though the 
ACLU argues that Section 552(c)’s legislative history 
evidences an intent to incorporate a “Glomar-like 
procedure,” we find that this evidence is inconclusive at 
best.
9
   
                                                 
9
 The ACLU cites two nearly identical statements by 
sponsoring representatives that describe the purpose of 
Section 552(c) as codifying the Government’s authority to 
neither confirm nor deny the existence of certain records that 
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Since passage of Section 552(c), it has been the 
Government’s “standard litigation policy” to respond to a 
FOIA plaintiff’s suspicions that an exclusion was used 
with “an in camera declaration addressing this claim, one 
way or another.”  Attorney General’s Memorandum on 
the 1986 Amendments to the Freedom of Information 
Act, § G.4 & n.47 (Dec. 1987).  The courts that have 
addressed this practice have generally approved.  See, 
e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, 2013 WL 
4436533, at *10 (approving of procedure and collecting 
cases).
10
  In short, we find no legal authority compelling 
the District Court to employ the ACLU’s proposed 
                                                                                                             
had been provided in Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1012.  To the 
extent we consider these statements to be evidence of 
legislative intent, we note that they only purport to 
incorporate from Phillippi the Government’s authority to 
neither confirm nor deny the existence of records, not the 
obligation to publicly justify such a response. 
10
 The Sixth Circuit in Am. Civil Liberties Union of Michigan 
notes that “[i]n only one narrow context have courts engaged 
in public review of the use of a § 552(c) exclusion: with 
respect to subsection (2), dealing with an informant’s records 
after official confirmation of that informant.”  2013 WL 
4436533, at *9 (collecting cases).  The ACLU does not 
suggest in this case that the FBI is excluding information 
related to an officially confirmed informant, or any other 
information that is ineligible for exclusion due to public 
exposure.  Cf. id. (“[T]he ACLU has not suggested that any 
excluded materials have been declassified, and thus a public 
proceeding on this matter is unnecessary.”).    
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procedure. 
Nor are we convinced that adopting the ACLU’s 
proposed procedure would be wise from a policy 
perspective.  In a recent related decision, the Sixth 
Circuit explained that this procedure would do little to 
facilitate judicial review: 
Under the ACLU’s procedure, the parties 
would litigate a hypothetical question: 
whether the type of information sought by 
the plaintiff would be excludable under § 
552(c), if such records exist. In most cases, 
this litigation will consist of little more than 
speculation by the plaintiff that the agency is 
not following the requirements of § 552(c), 
and the agency conclusorily responding that 
its search for and processing of records does 
follow the requirements. In such a case, only 
the district court, through in camera 
inspection, could judge the merits of the 
agency’s response. More imaginative 
plaintiffs might make more specific 
challenges, positing the existence of a 
certain class of documents and arguing that 
they should not be excluded. This would 
ordinarily be a difficult exercise—it is hard 
to know what types of secrets the 
government is concealing—and plaintiffs 
may need to propose many different kinds of 
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potentially withheld information. The 
government is then tasked with responding 
to these shots in the dark, a strange and 
difficult task given that few are likely to be 
tethered to reality, and fashioning a response 
is fraught with concerns of accidentally 
disclosing the existence or nonexistence of 
secret information. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, 2013 WL 
4436533, at *10.  By contrast, the in camera procedure 
employed by the District Court allows it to examine the 
actual information withheld if and when it is actually 
withheld.  In this way, an in camera procedure provides 
for more meaningful judicial review than does the 
“Glomar-like” method of adjudicating “[o]pen ended 
hypothetical questions,” which “are not well suited to the 
litigation process.” Id.  Further, a district court’s use of 
an in camera procedure does not hinder review on 
appeal, because appellate courts can also employ this 
procedure, as we have done in this case.   
 On review of the agency’s in camera 
declaration, we conclude that the District Court did not 
err in concluding that if an exclusion was employed, it 
was and remains amply justified. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM 
 21 
 
the judgment of the District Court.   
